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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 November 1959

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

2K
Czechoslovakia-India: Czechoslovakia, the second bloc country to commit itself to aid for India's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66), on 24 November extended a \$46,000,000 credit for the construction of heavy industrial projects. The USSR agreed in July to provide an initial credit of \$375,000,000 for the third plan. Bloc credits to India since 1955 now total almost \$750,000,000, less than \$175,000,000 of which has been delivered. Most of the aid projects agreed on earlier will be implemented after the start of the third plan. [REDACTED] (Page 1)

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2K
*USSR: Recently announced Soviet personnel changes symptomatic of political maneuvering at the level immediately below Khrushchev may indicate that other and more decisive shifts are in the offing--perhaps at the party central committee plenum scheduled for late December. Yan Kalnberzin, a long-time party boss in Latvia, was replaced on 25 November; there was no clarification of his status as a candidate member of the all-union party presidium. Nikolai Ignatov, a full member of the all-union party presidium, who apparently has been in some disfavor since his appointment in April to the ceremonial job of titular head of state in the Russian Republic (RSFSR), has been recalled to full-time party work after only seven months in the RSFSR post. On the face of it, Ignatov has regained the ground lost earlier. As is often the case in Soviet politics, other leaders at Ignatov's level may be blamed for having advocated his earlier demotion. [REDACTED]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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DK

Tunisia: Tunisian foreign policy may be moving toward a more neutral position. The government, which a few weeks ago claimed it would not accept a resident Czechoslovak ambassador, apparently now will accept the Czech nominee and name a Tunisian ambassador to Prague. Tunisia has also agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland, and Bourguiba has declared his intention of "normalizing relations" with the USSR early in 1960. [REDACTED] (Page 3)

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ND

Japan: Prospects for the development of an effective anti-Communist Japanese Democratic Socialist party have improved with the defection on 25 November of 12 more Diet members from the leftist-dominated Japanese Socialist party. The 12 immediately moved with the moderate Socialist group to organize the preparatory committee for the new party, which is to be officially established in January. The Diet strength of the moderate Socialist group now totals 45--about one fifth of the Socialists' strength in the Diet. The new party's staying power will depend not only on attracting additional Diet members but also on developing local support organizations. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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III. THE WEST

N^D France: A considerable number of French deputies, irked over the Debré government's high-handed treatment of the National Assembly, are using the politically popular issue of veterans' pensions to press the first vote of censure under a provision of the new constitution. While there is broad sentiment in favor of the Socialist-sponsored censure motion which comes to a vote on 27 November, the majority of the deputies are probably not ready to risk the dissolution of the assembly which De Gaulle has threatened if the cabinet is censured by the assembly.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

India to Receive at Least \$46,000,000 in Czech Credits

An Indo-Czech \$46,000,000 loan agreement signed in New Delhi on 24 November is the Soviet bloc's second contract for assistance to India's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) and raises total bloc aid committed specifically to the third plan to over \$420,000,000. The Soviet Union's initial \$375,000,000 credit extended for the plan last July and the new Czech loan bring the total value of bloc credits to India since 1955 to nearly \$750,000,000. Only \$175,000,000 of this has been delivered to New Delhi, primarily for the Soviet-assisted Bhilai steel mill in central India. Most of the major bloc projects negotiated previously will be implemented after the start of the third plan.

Prague's new loan, which is about twice the size of its previous credits to India, apparently is designed to expand a Czech-assisted foundry-forge project to be built at Ranchi in Bihar State primarily as a supply center for a heavy machine tool plant which the USSR plans to build in the area. The Czechs will also supply machinery for new heavy industrial projects, probably in the same area, and have offered to train Indian technicians in Czechoslovakia as well as to supply equipment for a technical institute in India.

Most of Czechoslovakia's previous assistance is designed to cover half the initial cost of the Ranchi foundry-forge project, for which an agreement was signed in August 1958. Other projects covered by earlier Czech credits include three sugar plants, a cement plant, assistance for a thermoelectric power plant, and a factory to produce electric computing machines. [REDACTED]

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Tunisia Shifts Toward More Neutralist Policy

Tunisia's foreign policy appears to be shifting from Western-oriented "nonalignment" toward a more neutralist position. An editorial recently published by the independent daily newspaper As Sabah, which often advances as trial balloons proposals subsequently advocated by the Neo-Destour party, commented, "We must inform the world that Tunisian foreign policy is based on positive neutrality and nonattachment to any bloc."

The American ambassador in Tunis commented that this editorial was one of the first he had seen using the phrase "positive neutrality," while the phrase "nonalignment" seemed to be disappearing from the Tunisian political lexicon. A reformulation of Tunisian foreign policy has been hinted at in other press articles and in campaign speeches prior to the general elections on 8 November.

Tunisia also appears to be moving more rapidly toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc. Although a few weeks ago the Czechoslovak Embassy--established in July--was to have remained indefinitely without a resident ambassador, Prague now has appointed Emanuel Brazda as ambassador to Tunis rather than Frantizek Zachystal, who was to have resided in Rabat. Tunisia apparently agreed to an exchange of ambassadors with Warsaw at the time it renewed its commercial agreement with Poland on 7 November. Warsaw has announced the Tunisian Government's decision, but Tunis has not. President Bourguiba said at a press conference on 12 November that relations probably would be established with the USSR in 1960 and that he anticipated sending more delegations to the USSR.

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III. THE WEST

French Deputies Attempt First Censure Vote Against Debré Government

Many National Assembly deputies, increasingly annoyed by the government's high-handed treatment of Parliament, have seized on the popular issue of veterans' pensions to make clear their dissatisfaction. Under the Fourth Republic, all veterans received approximately \$30 a year. The 1959 austerity budget, adopted by decree when there was no parliament, eliminated veterans' pensions except in cases of major disability. The 1960 budget submitted to Parliament is only slightly more lenient. The issue is one which cuts across party lines, and gives the deputies a chance to express their dissatisfaction over the degree to which the assembly's powers have been curtailed.

The constitution of the Fifth Republic provides two methods making the government responsible to Parliament. The premier may request a confidence vote on a declaration of general policy--as in the case of De Gaulle's Algerian program--or the National Assembly may initiate a formal motion of censure. This method, now undertaken for the first time, requires a petition signed by at least one tenth of the members, a 48-hour delay before the vote, and adoption by a majority of the whole house. If the censure motion is rejected, its sponsors may not propose another during the same session.

Even though considerable sentiment exists in favor of the Socialist-sponsored censure motion to be voted upon on 27 November, there is little reason to believe that the Debré government or the 1960 budget will be repudiated. The majority of the deputies are not ready to risk the dissolution of the assembly which, in view of De Gaulle's long-standing warning against the censure procedure, would probably follow a government crisis brought about by parliamentary action. Moreover, De Gaulle's public refusal to make concessions on the veterans' pensions limits the extent to which the deputies can defy the President, whose popularity is still great throughout France.

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